

REPORT OF JUDICIAL INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

15

IF INFORMATION IS REPORTED IN FAILING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH SEPARATELY AND APPENDIX

SECTION I: APPOINTMENT

Appointing Power(s) Pursuant to AR 15-6, paragraph 3-1, LTC [REDACTED] Commanding
[REDACTED] Commandant.

On 18 May 2005 [REDACTED] instance, Letter of Appointment or Summary of Trial appointment was issued, AR 15-6, AR 15-6.

SECTION II: SESSIONS

At the time of trial, witness commanded at FOB [REDACTED] SEC [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

On 18 May 2005, it is found that due to lack of investigation, witness [REDACTED] present at the trial, the trial date & witness report were denied. She failed to take proper care of her trial preparation and representation of witness during the trial. The following persons, including investigators, witness, and trial manager, failed to represent witness fairly and timely, i.e. Plaintiff, Recorder, Lawyer, Legal Advisor.

The following persons, Lawyer, Recorder, Lawyer, Legal Advisor, Lawyer, were absent. Due to lack of experience of each attorney, they failed to follow AR 15-6.

For whom the officer spent time gathering leading evidence at [REDACTED] SEC [REDACTED] 18 May 2005
and completed / charged the investigations at [REDACTED] 0030 SEC [REDACTED] 18 May 2005

SECTION III: CHECKLIST FOR PRACTICES

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES

Complete form 3-1 AR 15-6

YES NO N/A

- Are the following trials and related proceedings fair to all parties involved?
- Is the trial date set reasonably early?
- Are trials held in appropriate, orderly, and timely manner?
- Does the attorney work cooperatively with the investigating officer?
- Is there written documentation to record the proceedings adequately?
- Provide full information to the investigating officer?
- Cooperation by the investigating officer or board of any unnecessary delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered, e.g., absence of necessary witnesses?
- Testimony is in sequence of events and not scattered on page 1 of the report?
- Are the significant points kept brief, objective, including no admissions or implications of guilt?

A FORM 1524, MAR 83

EDITION OF NOV 75 IS OBSOLETE

² *See also* *W. D. Bremner, The War against the Indians in the West, 1865-1890*

All personnel involved in the incident acted in accordance with the "CPLCC Rules For Use Of Forces" (Code of Conduct) and ANNEX E (Rules Of Engagement) to MND-B OPORD [REDACTED] OIF [REDACTED]. The Soldiers had legitimate reason to believe that the individual was the IED triggerman, and that their actions were necessary to prevent further attacks against Coalition Forces by a third party.

All Soldiers (CPT [REDACTED], SFC [REDACTED], SSG [REDACTED] and SGT [REDACTED]) in accordance with the CHIEF's guidance at the time of selection of Person X. Warning shots were aimed behind the fleeing individual with the intent to startle him. Live rounds were fired directly at the fleeing individual. The cease fire order was given once the individual fell to the ground.

SSG [REDACTED] and SAs [REDACTED] previously identified (RJD) their target, and took necessary precautions to ensure that the collected damage would result based on engaging the suspected targetman.

No detonation device was found on the individual or in the immediate vicinity. However, the suspect could have posed at or immediately following the IED explosion, as he was fleeing from the scene, away from the Broad St. area or was left there.

The crew of A-10 determined upon their arrival that the suspected triggerman was dead and remained at the location until 1550Z 0.4.10.2000 hours to recover the body.

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view of the above findings, the following directions are recommended:

- Continue the use of [REDACTED] to inform the local population about curfew hours and possible consequences of going out during curfew hours.
 - Ensure ROE to include "Explanation of Force" is incorporated into all joint safety briefs prior to leaving any FOB or base location.
 - Continue to conduct Reinforcement ROE training during After Action Reviews for all engagements that result in enemy casualties.
 - Identify and learn basic Arabic phrases - i.e. Soldiers that finance our basic commands - Step [REDACTED] right side... .

SECTION V - ANNOTATION SECTION

THIS PAGE IS TO BE FILLED IN WHEN THE INVESTIGATION IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS PAGE IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. IT IS NOT TO BE COPIED OR DISCLOSED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY THE SUPERVISOR OR HIS/her APPROVAL.

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SECTION VI - INSPECTOR REPORT FORM 13-2, SR 154

For action indicated in inspection report, the undersigned checks the status of the findings and recommendations of the investigation, advising his supervisor with findings and/or recommendations in which his supervisory authority does not coincide. Note the name of supervisor. Both the investigative findings and/or recommendations may be numbered in the inspection report.

SEARCHED

INDEXED

SECTION VII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY FORM 2-2, SR 154

For findings and recommendations of the investigating officer, those are subject to correspondence regarding and suspending administrative. If the commanding authority refers to proceedings to the investigating officer or himself for further information, an executive action which shall correspond to the inquiry. If such is so numbered in inspect.,

Classified Documents Removed



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BATTALION, 70TH ARMOR REGIMENT
FOB [REDACTED], IRAQ
APO AE [REDACTED]

AFZN-BB-T

20 MAY 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR
COMMANDER, 3RD BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 5TH ARMORED DIVISION
COMMANDER, 2ND BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION
SUBJECT: AR 15-6, BGT no. _____ (Shooting of Local National vicinity of
[REDACTED] Iraq)

1. Enclosed is the 15-3 investigation outlining the circumstances that resulted in the shooting of a focal national. As a result of the incident, one Iraqi citizen was killed. The shooting occurred along ROUTE [REDACTED] vicinity [REDACTED] on 13 May 2005.

2. SUMMARY:

On 132240MAY2005, B section, 3RD Platoon, A Company, 1-41ST Infantry departed Forward Operating Base (FOB) [REDACTED] in [REDACTED], Iraq en route to FOB [REDACTED] in [REDACTED], Iraq. The section consisted of two Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV), A-33 and A-34, and 12 personnel. A-33 contained SSG [REDACTED] (Bradley Commander), SGT [REDACTED] (Gunner), PFC [REDACTED] (Driver), and LT [REDACTED] and LT [REDACTED] as passengers. A-34 contained SPC [REDACTED] (BC), SGT [REDACTED] (Gunner), SPC [REDACTED] (Driver), and SGT [REDACTED] SGT [REDACTED] SPC [REDACTED], and PVT [REDACTED] as passengers. A-33 was the lead vehicle and A-34 was the trail vehicle. On or about 132250MAY2005, the A-33 was attacked by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) moving North along ROUTE [REDACTED] vicinity [REDACTED]. Upon detonation of the IED, A-33 immediately pushed through the IED kill zone approximately 150 meters, and began assessing damage to the vehicle and injuries to personnel. A-34 remained in place, approximately 100 meters away from the IED site. After a thorough check, both Bradley Commanders determined there were no injuries or damage to equipment and reported this to their Company Command Post (CP). Due to the possible dangers still present, all crewmen and passengers remained inside the vehicles.

Both vehicles then began scanning the area with the vehicle's thermal sights for possible triggermen, A-33 to the West and A-34 to the East. At approximately 2255, SGT [REDACTED] A-33 Gunner, identified a man lying in a field

about 250 meters West of their location on ROUTE [REDACTED]. SSG [REDACTED] reported this to SFC [REDACTED] and informed him to stop the vehicle and dismount. The man's actions were suspicious. In addition to the fact he was out past the end time of 2200-0000. The man then drove slowly and the crew noticed that he had a glove in his hand. The man began to run from the location, shooting randomly with his weapon. The Bradley's were recalled. SFC [REDACTED] reported this to his Company CP, and received guidance from the Company Executive Officer, CPT [REDACTED], to engage in accordance with the Rules of Engagement (ROE). CPT [REDACTED] then reported this to the Battalion TOC.

In following the ROE Escalation of Force model, shooting would have been futile due to the distance between the vehicles created by the Bradley's movement. Showing or showing weapons was not possible in this situation. After positively identifying the target, and making a quick assessment that no collateral damage would occur, SSG [REDACTED] instructed his gunner to fire warning bursts near the fleeing man in an attempt to make him halt. SGT [REDACTED] continued to shoot at the man with the 7.62 coaxial machine gun. The suspected triggerman continued to run, undeterred by the warning shots. Adhering to the Escalation of Force model, SSG [REDACTED] instructed SGT [REDACTED] to fire killing shots at the man. Continuing to positively identify the target and assess any possible collateral damage, SGT [REDACTED] fired 8 killing bursts, hitting the suspected triggerman in the head, ultimately killing him. Once the man dropped to the ground, SSG [REDACTED] instructed his gunner to cease firing. SSG [REDACTED] explained that because there was no opportunity to zero the 7.62 coaxial machine gun on his vehicle, it took 4 bursts to kill the suspected triggerman. SFC [REDACTED] reported the death of the suspected triggerman to his Company CP.

SFC [REDACTED] then took A-34 to the site where the suspected triggerman fell, vicinity [REDACTED], approximately 500 meters Northwest of their location on ROUTE [REDACTED], while A-33 remained in place to provide overwatch and security. Upon reaching the suspected triggerman's body, they determined that SSG [REDACTED] searched him for possible detonation devices. Upon completing the search, they found the man was carrying only a pistol belt, but no detonation devices. SFC [REDACTED] and his crewmembers then searched the surrounding area in an attempt to find a detonation device, to no avail. He and his crew then called their Company CP for assistance in recovering the body, remaining in place until SSG [REDACTED], 2nd Platoon Sergeant, B Company, 2-70 AR and his section came to recover the body. At approximately 2330, SSG [REDACTED] and his section arrived and took the body to the [REDACTED] Mosque in [REDACTED] adjacent the Iraqi Army Compound. The following day, 14 MAY 2005, the man's wife and son arrived to claim his body. The man was identified as [REDACTED]

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3. FACTS:

- a) How many local nationals were involved in the incident?
- a. One Iraqi citizen was involved in the incident.
 - * 1 x KIA (1 adult male)
- b) When was the suspected triggerman first spotted and by whom?
- a. SGT [REDACTED] A-33 Gunner. Initially spotted the suspected triggerman lying in a field to the West of their location on or about 132255MAY05.
 - b. SGT [REDACTED] immediately notified his Bradley Commander SSG [REDACTED], who reported sighting of the suspected triggerman to SPC [REDACTED], the patrol leader and Platoon Sergeant.
- c) What assumption or guideline was referenced when unit engaged, first with warning shots, then with killing shots?
- a. Battalion Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) advise elements to immediately scan the surrounding area for triggermen after being struck by an IED.
 - b. Paragraph 3.A.3 in ANNEX E (RULES OF ENGAGEMENT) to MND-B OPORD [REDACTED] (OIF [REDACTED] DECISIVE OPERATIONS) provides Coalition Forces the authority to use up to Deadly Force to negate the threat of individuals committing a hostile act or demonstrating hostile intent.
 - c. Battalion guidance on the issue of IED triggerman is to attempt to capture the suspected triggerman, and if not possible to capture the triggerman, use up to Deadly Force to stop the triggerman.
- d) Did the element that engaged the suspected triggerman positively identify (PID) the target and assess possible collateral damage prior to engaging?
- a. The suspected triggerman displayed three specific suspicious actions that led to the engagement. He was lying in the field and appeared to be observing the vehicles and the IED site, the fact that he was out past curfew, and his running away with a shovel that could have been used to implant the IED were grounds for the section to be reasonably certain that he was the IED triggerman.
 - b. The crew that engaged the individual was informed that no friendly forces were in the area and they did observe the area for possible collateral damage prior to engaging. No other individuals were spotted and there were no buildings or structures in the area.

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- e) Were local citizens of [REDACTED] aware of the curfew hours?
- A 1-41 IN Company Commander CPT [REDACTED] stated that the Tactical Psyops Team (TPT) has broadcast the curfew hours (2100-0600 daily) throughout the town, as well as distribute flyers and pamphlets to the local population telling them when curfew hours are.
- f) Did the section observing the suspected triggerman use the ROE Escalation of Force mode after identifying the suspected triggerman?
- The requirements in the ROE Escalation of Force mode are not applicable in this situation. However, what has been true to my knowledge and belief involved, showing and warning from [REDACTED] weapons were not applicable in this situation. [REDACTED] warning shots were fired in close proximity to the individual prior to elevating to Deadly Force.
- g) When and where were the first warning shot(s) fired?
- After the suspected triggerman arose and began running away from his location with shovel in hand, and the Company Executive Officer instructed section to engage following ROE Escalation of Force, three 2-3 round bursts were fired behind the man in an attempt to make him stop.
- h) When were lethal fires initiated to stop the suspected triggerman and when was the Cease Fire command given?
- Battalion TTP, and the refusal of the individual to heed multiple warning shots.
 - The Cease Fire command was given once the suspect triggerman fell to the ground.
- i) What means did the unit use to educate Soldiers on the use of escalated force (IAW CFLOCC ROE) and the initiation of warning, disabling, and lethal fires?
- The Soldiers involved in the incident received and conducted the following ROE training briefings:
 - Pre-NTC ROE Training (OCT 04)
 - NTC RSOI ROE Training (OCT/NOV 04)
 - Home-station TSIRF and Pre-deployment Training (DEC/JAN 04)
 - Kuwait RSOI ROE Vignette Training (FEB 05)
 - Patrol brief by patrol leader prior to leaving FOB St. Joseph
 - Reinforcement ROE training following an over-life engagements which result in enemy casualties.

4. FINDINGS:

- a) All Soldiers involved in the engagement acted in accordance with the CJFC Rule of Engagement (as of 011800ZNOV03) and ANNEX E (Rules Of Engagement) to MND-B OPORD 05-012 (OIF 04-05 Decisive Operations). The Soldiers have legitimate reasons believe that the individual was the IED triggerman, and that these actions would prevent future hostile acts against Coalition Forces by this individual.
- b) All Soldiers (CPT [REDACTED], SFC [REDACTED], SSG [REDACTED] and SGT [REDACTED]) acted in accordance with the CJFC guidance in the use of "Escalation of Force". Warning shots were aimed behind the fleeing individual with the intent to make him stop. Lethal shots were aimed directly at the fleeing individual. The cease fire order was given once the individual fell to the ground.
- c) SSG [REDACTED] and SGT [REDACTED] positively identified (PID) their target, and took necessary precautions to ensure that no collateral damage would result based on engaging the suspected triggerman.
- d) No detonation device was found on the individual or in the immediate vicinity. However, the suspect could have gotten rid of it immediately following the IED explosion, or as he was fleeing from the scene, away from the Bradley section and IED site.
- e) The crew of A-34 confirmed the suspected triggerman was dead after arriving at his location and checking his vital signs. They remained at that location until SSG [REDACTED] and his section came to recover the body.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a) Continue the use of Tactical Psyops Team (TPT) to inform the local population about curfew hours and possible consequences of being out during curfew hours.
- b) Ensure ROE to include "Escalation of Force" is incorporated into all patrol safety briefs prior to leaving any FOB or static location.
- c) Continue to conduct Reinforcement: ROE training during After Action Reviews on all engagements that result in enemy casualties.
- d) Identify and teach basic Arabic phrases to all Soldiers that focuses on basic commands ("Stop", "Turn around", etc...).
- e) Develop a plan to add zeroing of individual, crew-served, and vehicle weapons systems to the Company's weekly training calendar.

Encl.

- (1) 15-B Appointment Orders
- (2) Sworn Statements
- (3) Paragraph 3, ANNEX E (Rules Of Engagement) to MND-B OPORD 05-012
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
CPT, SC
Investigating Officer



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2nd BATTALION, 70th ARMOR REGIMENT
POB [REDACTED], IRAQ
APO AE [REDACTED]

REF ID: A
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

AFZN-BB-TCO

16 May 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR CPT [REDACTED] 2-70th AR BN, 3rd BCT, 1st AD, FOB St. Michael, Iraq 09378

SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer

1. Pursuant to AR 15-6, paragraph 2-1, you are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to investigate the allegation of a shooting of a local national that occurred on or about 15 May 2005 by elements of A Company, 1/41 Infantry Battalion.
2. In your investigation, use procedures under AR 15-6, Chapter 4, for an informal board of officers. All witness statements will be sworn, and you will follow the procedures in AR 15-6, paragraph 3-7e for Privacy Act statements. If the person you are interviewing states that he/she does not know anything about the allegations, prepare a sworn statement to that effect for the witness to sign. If, in the course of your investigation, you suspect a soldier has committed an offense under the UCMJ, you must advise and read him/her their rights under the UCMJ, Article 31, or the Fifth Amendment, as appropriate, prior to conducting any interview.
3. During your investigation, answer the following questions:
 - a. What was the sequence of events that led up to the incident?
 - b. Did the soldiers involved properly escalate the use of force?
 - c. Did the soldiers have Positive Identification (were they reasonable certain that the object of attack was a legitimate military target) before engaging the local national?
 - d. What is the unit's Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) prior to engaging a local national?
 - e. Were there any Law of War violations?
 - f. What can the unit do to decrease the number of shooting involving local nationals?
 - g. Are there any operational lessons that should be captured and disseminated?

- h. Were there any other contributing factors that, if changed, could have altered the outcome?
4. If it becomes evident that there is possible misconduct outside the scope of your investigation, notify the appointing authority immediately. If during your investigation you become aware of information that needs command attention, immediately notify the appointing authority for guidance.
5. You may obtain assistance from CPT [REDACTED], the Command Judge Advocate for 3rd BCT, 1st AD. CPT [REDACTED] will serve as your legal counsel and can be contacted at 242-6294 (see SPC [REDACTED] to coordinate). Prior to starting your investigation, you should contact him for legal guidance concerning your investigation.
6. Submit your findings and recommendations on DA Form 1574 to CPT [REDACTED] for legal review no later than 23 May 2005.

LTC, AH
Commanding

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AF 100-16; the preparer agency is CGCSWING.

AUTHORITY:

Title 10 USC Section 201; Title 5 USC Section 2051; 10 CFR 2087 dated November 22, 1945 (SSNL)

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:

To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately

ROUTINE USES:

Your social security number is used as an additional element of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE:

Disclosing of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION

2. DATE INTERVIEWED

3. TIME

4. FILE NUMBER

5. LASTNAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME

2005-0516

2029

6. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

6. SOCN

7. GRADE/STATUS

8.

I WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

On 13 May 05 at 2034 [REDACTED] at an FSD C [REDACTED]. At the time I was on the radio in our TAC At 2242 [REDACTED] called me and reported seeing a man running with a shard, away from their position. Upon hearing this and knowing it was after curfew, I instructed [REDACTED] to engage and destroy the triggerman running with the shard. [REDACTED] killed the individual, who had a shard and a pistol belt. [REDACTED] did not find any identification tokens from the scene. The following morning on 14 May 05 the men finally recovered his body from the trap. They recovered the shard.

10. EXHIBIT

1A

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEARING STATEMENT, TAKEN AT, DATED,

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST READ THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

[REDACTED]

TAKEN AT

[REDACTED]

DATED

16 May 05

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

he was working his farm. However, no shot lists or logs were found at the scene. — end of statement —

[REDACTED]

STATEMENT

WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE MADE NO CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF ANYONE'S INFLUENCE, OR INFLUENCE OF ANYONE ELSE.

WITNESSES:

Signed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 16th day of May, 2005
at [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Signature of Person Administering Oath

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Signature of Person Administering Oath

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

UMRA V105